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Market Forces in Domestic Adoptions:
Advocating a Quantitative Limit on Private
Agency Adoption Fees
Jack Darcher
INTRODUCTION
Since at least the early 1970s, there has been a widening gap in the
United States between the number of prospective adoptive parents and the
relatively diminishing supply of children eligible for adoption. As detailed
later in this article, adoption (as a form of family formation) continues to
expand in terms of popularity and availability. This increased availability
comes from both the creation of new forms of adoption, such as open
adoption, and from the qualification of new categories of adoptive parents,
such as single adults and gay couples. Due to these factors and the expected
permanence of reproductive rights, this gap is likely to persist and expand
into the twenty-first century.
Regardless of the various avenues of placement that adoptive parents
pursue, market forces exist within the adoption process. While observers
might rightfully feel uncomfortable speaking about adoption in financial
terms, the influence of adoptive parents’ desires and preferences on the
adoption market requires that market forces be recognized and discussed.
Only within the last quarter century has legislation been enacted that has
effectively influenced this market behavior. However, with the exception of
statutes targeting black-market adoption, these measures have never
intentionally confronted the economics of the adoption market. Meanwhile,
social and legal commentators have taken a great interest in the market
forces of adoption. Key amongst these commentators is Judge Richard
Posner, who has advocated a system of free-market adoption. While the
idea of a legal free market for adoption has existed for some time, its
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benefits have rarely been seriously contemplated. And although the human
costs of such a deregulated market prevent its realization, its benefits
warrant a discussion on the role of legislation in influencing adoption
market behavior.
This article begins by exploring the social and cultural forces that have
contributed to the adoption crunch. Then, after surveying the various
available avenues for adoption, this article will give background
information about the market forces in adoption and the competing
philosophical views on these forces. Next, the article will cover past and
present measures that have influenced both market forces and market
behavior. Finally, the article will make proposals for additional steps, while
acknowledging their flaws.
Ultimately, this article seeks to establish that adoption regulation must be
crafted to modify adoption market behavior for maximum societal wealth,
while taking every effort to protect the personhood interests of the adoptee.
This article appraises two possible avenues toward this goal, each of them
embracing the economic aspects of adoptions while striving to divert
adoption away from “grey-market” independent adoption and into more
regulated and humane adoption formats. The first possibility, the
federalization of adoption, is fraught with constitutional obstacles. While
this approach might become more feasible as international adoption
becomes more prevalent, and thus requires a more uniform national
approach to adoption, it also suffers from the morally and politically
distasteful necessity of justifying the federalization of adoption under the
purview of the Constitution’s Commerce Clause.1 As discussed later, the
mere conception of adoption in such market terms could arguably have such
a dehumanizing effect on the adoption process that it actually threatens the
public acceptance of the institution of adoption. Given these immense
obstacles, this approach, in this author’s opinion, is not viable.
The second proposal is a cap on private agency adoption fees. By
lowering the overall costs of adoption for those who choose agency
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adoption, this measure would make agency adoption more attractive than
independent adoption, having the effect of decreasing the commodification
of adoption and protecting the personhood of the child. Although burdened
with several drawbacks, this measure could be instituted at either the federal
or state level and could be either voluntary or mandatory. In any of these
forms, a quantitative limit on private agency adoption fees will counteract
or reverse the destructive effects of market forces in domestic adoption
while preserving the advantages of agency adoption. Thus, a limit would
provide many of the benefits of free-market adoption while avoiding its
critical detriments.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Twentieth Century Adoption Trends
Some history of adoption’s progression in the twentieth century is
necessary in order to appreciate the influence and importance of the
adoption measures that this article will evaluate and promote. Moreover, it
is important to understand the economic forces currently at play in
adoption. Of particular importance for this article is the creation of the wide
gap between the supply and demand for healthy infants that adoption has
been experiencing for approximately forty years.
Adoption reached its peak numbers in the United States during the 1960s,
with over 140,000 adoptions taking place in 1965.2 In remarkable contrast, a
mere 16,000 adoptions took place in 1938.3 Various explanations have been
given for this noteworthy increase, the most persuasive being the erosion of
adoption’s stigma as an illicit and morally questionable institution.4
Changes in child welfare policies and state adoption laws helped create a
perception of adoption as a generous and selfless measure, whereas it had
earlier been perceived as an abnormal practice.5
A shift in cultural views of genetics also played an important role.6 In the
first third of the twentieth century, the theory of eugenics had gained
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significant popularity, creating the idea that orphaned children possessed
inferior mental and physical traits and, therefore, were not entitled to the
benefits of a nuclear family.7 However, studies in the 1920s, the creation of
child welfare advocacy groups, and an overall resistance to the theory of
eugenics reversed this view of adoptive children, and by the mid-1950s
prospective parents started outnumbering eligible adoptees.8
For at least a decade after this point, the number of available adoptees
continued to grow with the expanding demand; out-of-wedlock births
soared from 88,000 in 1938 to 201,000 in 1958.9 And due to the increased
tolerance for illegitimacy, agencies began dealing directly with pregnant
women and offering services to help them bring their children to term in a
compassionate atmosphere.10 Also, agencies became less concerned with
placing adoptees according to their religious, cultural, and racial heritage.
The adoption of older and handicapped children became more
commonplace as well.11
However, the rate of adoptions plummeted after 1970, as agencies began
experiencing a rapid decrease in the number of available adoptees. Several
explanations have been given for this result. One commonly identified
cause is the increased access to contraceptives and abortion following
seminal Supreme Court decisions.12 While these decisions represented a
breakthrough for the sexual revolution, their impact on adoption was
seemingly immediate; from 1970 to 1975, adoptions fell from 89,000 to
50,000.13
Additionally, those unwed mothers who did choose to bear children more
often decided to keep them. In 1973, 20 percent of unwed mothers placed
their child in adoption; by 1982, this rate dropped to 12 percent.14 The
availability of contraceptives and abortion now made motherhood a
conscious choice.15 Also, the social stigma for single mothers was eroding.16
Judge Richard Posner, whose views of adoption will be focused on later,
cites this increased retention of unwed children as the leading cause for the
decline in available adoptees. He suggests that the number of illegitimate
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births remained steady, but fewer children were being given up for
adoption.17
While the supply of adoptive children has been dwindling, the supply of
potential adoptive parents has been increasing. The ability to adopt, which
had previously been limited to married heterosexuals, has become
accessible to unmarried couples, same-sex couples, and single persons
regardless of sexuality in most states.18 Additionally, despite advances in
assisted reproduction, the national number of infertile couples increased
substantially in the latter part of the twentieth century, most likely due to a
trend to delay childbearing in the baby boomer generation.19 However, the
increased use of assisted reproduction might actually contribute to a
lessened demand for adoptees since fewer infertile couples are seeking to
adopt.20
Perhaps the strongest indicator of the gap between adoption’s supply and
its demand is the growth of intercountry adoption in the United States. It
seems logical to assume that increased availability and access for
intercountry adoption would decrease the demand for domestic adoptees,
thereby theoretically reducing domestic adoption fees. Any success in
reducing adoption fees domestically might also help promote domestic
adoption over intercountry adoption. However, this possibility confronts
two obstacles. First, people who seek intercountry adoption often do so
because of nonmonetary barriers that present themselves in domestic
adoption, such as barriers some countries have pertaining to age and family
structure (single or unmarried adoptive parents). Second, there is a question
as to whether a decrease in adoption costs could persuade a potential
adoptive parent to change their preferences when it comes to their potential
child. However, while intercountry adoption feasibly helps relieve domestic
demand for adoptive children, it is an immense topic that is beyond the
scope of this article.
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B. Adoption Avenues
While adoption has evolved according to various social forces, it has also
been impacted by economic forces. The imbalance between the supply and
demand for healthy infants has manifested itself in all aspects of adoption—
from foster care adoption to private independent adoption. Before
examining the various theories evaluating these economic forces in
adoption, the three major forms of adoption must be described: public
adoption (either via foster care or a public adoption agency), private agency
adoption (including both closed adoption and open adoption, as
distinguished below), and independent adoption.
1. Public Adoption
Public adoption—adoption undertaken solely through state avenues—can
take one of two forms: foster adoption or public adoption agency. In foster
adoption, the parental rights of the birth parents have not yet been fully
terminated; the child is in the custody of the state, but the possibility still
exists that he or she will be reunited with his or her parents under various
circumstances. In public agency adoption, the child is still under state
custody, but parental rights have been fully and unalterably terminated, as
discussed below.
The key distinction between public agency adoption and private agency
adoption is that the latter typically represents adoptions initiated by the
child’s biological parents, while public adoption represents the adoption of
children whose parental rights have been acquired by the state or a statelicensed agency. In public adoption, the child’s availability for adoption
usually requires that the parental rights of the birth parents have been
severed prior to any adoption proceeding—a difficult and painful process
and the source of much delay. Public adoption usually pertains to children
under state care and is the typical method of adoption for older or specialneeds children.21 These “wards of the state” include both abandoned
children and children removed from their parents by the state. The former
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group—abandoned children—may have come into state care by outright
abandonment, such as children found without identification, or may have
been handed to the state without legal consequence as the result of safehaven laws, which are now present in forty-seven states.22 The growing
popularity of such laws has increased the number of children flooding into
foster care.23
Unlike every other form of adoption, public adoption centers do not lack
a supply of children. In 2002, roughly 534,000 children were living in foster
care nationwide, of which roughly 126,000 were eligible for adoption.24
Currently, as a result of measures which are detailed later in this article,
public adoption is relatively cost free for adoptive parents. As opposed to
private agency and independent adoption, public agencies are nonprofit
organizations and do not charge a fee for placement. The only costs to
adoptive parents in public adoption usually come from legal fees, which are
minimal and are often reimbursed by the state.
The costs of public adoption to states, however, can be immense. These
costs include the housing and care for foster children under direct state
supervision and the payment of monthly stipends to foster parents providing
foster children a temporary living situation. Additionally, states must
employ hundreds of social workers dedicated to either repairing and
reuniting broken families or placing those children who cannot return into
foster homes. Finally, it is important to recognize the variety of other
administrative and legal costs associated with removing children from
negligent or abusive situations as well as the costs associated with providing
them with stable living situations.25
2. Private Agency Adoption
Private agency adoption, along with independent adoption, represents the
placement of children voluntarily given up for adoption by their birth
parents. Often, this involves the placement of infants and newborns.26
Private agencies originated as sources of adoptees for specific religious
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groups or other demographics. Today, agencies may possess a variety of
philosophical purposes, ranging from a general interest in promoting
adoption to providing an alternative to the abortion of unplanned
pregnancies.27 Some private agencies operate as alternatives to state-run
foster homes. Whatever the purpose, the agency must still adhere to state
regulations.28
By and large, these agencies are nonprofit organizations because most
states expressly prohibit profitable adoption. While children placed in
private adoption are often quickly matched with potential parents, the
opposite is true for the parents, who must often wait several years before
being matched with a child. The application process is likely to include
complex selection procedures specific to the agency, as well as substantial
fees for the agency’s services, regardless of whether placement is ultimately
successful.29 In particular, private agencies are more likely to apply
traditional conceptions of family when ranking potential parents for
placement: young, married, and heterosexual applicants are usually given
preference over older, single, or homosexual counterparts.30 Even if such
bias is prohibited by the state, private agencies are often capable of
excluding undesired applicants on pretextual grounds.31 Private agencies
may also apply stringent race-matching criteria in their adoption
placements, thereby severely delaying the adoption of children whose race
does not match that of the agency’s roster of prospective parents (and vice
versa).32
While the use of agency fees is now industry-wide, prior to the 1950s,
such mandatory payment was considered inappropriate.33 At that time,
agencies subsisted on voluntary donations made by adoptive parents out of
gratitude to the agencies.34 The introduction of agency fees, and the
commercialization of adoption in general, raised a multitude of ethical and
professional concerns.35 Of particular concern was the seeming duality that
such fees created between the perceived pricelessness of the child and a
legal arrangement that assigned a monetary value to children.36 Agencies
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justified the fees by limiting them to compensate the agency’s actual cost
for the adoption—a claim that is still adhered to today.37
However, despite this claimed adherence to operational costs, agency
fees have steadily risen. Estimates in the late 1980s put the average agency
fee between $7,000 and $10,000.38 By the end of the twentieth century, the
upper end of the fee range was estimated at $30,000.39 Less than five years
later, agencies were charging as much as $52,000 for adoption placement,
and price premiums were available for Caucasian children and expedited
service.40
Given this exponential rise in agency fees, much institutional effort has
been invested into validating this seemingly limitless expense without
claiming profit-seeking as a justification.41 While agencies advocate for
these fees as a symbolic expression of parental devotion,42 one possible
justification could be the need to provide birth mothers with the same
compensation available through the arena of independent adoption.
However, this author was unable to find any written evidence of agencies
using such a market-savvy justification, possibly because of the wariness to
acknowledge such economic forces within the adoption process.
3. Independent Adoption
Independent adoption is coordinated solely by the adoptive parents and
the birth parent, or a representative of these parties, and is completely
autonomous from any agency involvement. Representatives might be
attorneys, social workers, clergy, or even medical personnel. Most often,
birth mothers participating in the process of independent adoption are
seeking to form an adoption plan for an unborn child.43 Alternatively,
prospective birth parents might be using nonagency means to search for
children, most notably through adoption advertisements or a party who is
likely to know of mothers contemplating placing a child in adoption.
Due to the lack of agency-imposed safeguards against fraud, and the lack
of intensive screening processes and parent counseling, independent
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adoption is prohibited in several states.44 Safeguards still exist in those
states that allow independent adoption, most notably the requirement of a
home study during which a social worker determines the prospective
parents’ suitability to adopt. However, this process is not as rigorous as the
screening process that would be conducted by an agency.
Another possible policy justification for disallowing independent
adoption is its supposed proximity to black-market adoption, leading many
observers to refer to independent adoption as “the grey market.”45 In blackmarket adoptions, “baby brokers” connect adoptive parents with birth
mothers for direct profit. In a black-market adoption, birth mothers can
potentially profit by receiving money in excess of the compensation
permitted by state law. Also, adoptive parents do not have to endure yearslong waiting periods, nor are they subjected to an agency screening process.
The only difference, hypothetically, between an independent adoption and a
black-market adoption is the exchange of money that is expressly prohibited
by state law. However, black-market adoptions might also utilize forged or
fabricated versions of the necessary documents, such as home study reports.
While this type of adoption is rare in the United States, it still persists due to
its level of discreetness and the obvious financial benefits it affords to
unscrupulous birth parents and baby brokers.
Still, the differences between independent adoption and black-market
adoption are not necessarily as vague as dissenters might portray. Ideally,
an independent adoption only differs from an agency adoption in that the
screening process is conducted by a state social worker rather than the statesponsored agency representative. All other matters are conducted with the
same transparency and rigor as an agency adoption. As discussed later, this
transparency is enforced by laws in several states in the form of mandatory
disclosure of all adoption related expenses, along with close state
supervision of the parties’ financial transactions.
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4. Open Adoption
Open adoption is a relatively new variation of agency adoption that is
gaining in popularity and it is worth mentioning for its potential to increase
the supply of adoptees. In open adoption, prospective parents submit their
information to an agency. Birth parents who contact the agency are given
access to the various profiles of prospective parents. The birth parents select
several of the profiles, and the agency arranges meetings. The birth
parent(s) ultimately select the parent(s) with whom the child will be placed.
Additionally, the birth parents can negotiate a mutually agreeable level of
involvement in the child’s life after his or her birth, not unlike the visitation
arrangements of a divorce.
In theory, open adoption affords all parties advantages over traditional
“closed” adoption. The birth mother is spared some of the burden of
abandoning a child by being able to approve of the child’s new parents and
guarantee some involvement in and knowledge about the child’s future life.
The child benefits by growing up with knowledge of her origins and by
having a relationship with her biological parents while still having a
permanent and stable parental relationship with her adoptive parents. The
adoptive parents might benefit as well by relieving themselves of the
possible future stress of a resentful or restless adoptive child, one who feels
alienated from his or her genealogical identity. Ultimately, open adoption
could function as a means to increase the attractiveness of adoption for
single mothers or other disadvantaged parents who might otherwise keep
their children due to the trauma and uncertainty of giving a child up for
adoption, or who might abort the pregnancy out of these same fears.
Having discussed the three major forms of adoption, this article can now
address the economic and social theorists’ positions on the adoption market.
Because adoption involves moral questions on the value of human life in
the context of a human exchange, theorists have taken different positions on
how to deal with the market forces at play in the adoption industry. This
next section will address two of the most prominent views posed by such
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observers and commentators, namely the free market of personhood models
of adoption. The section will then conclude by discussing the emergence of
a third view, the poststructuralist view, and its potential to bridge the free
market and personhood models.

II. SCHOLARLY VIEWPOINTS OF MARKET FORCES IN ADOPTION
Several legal theorists have addressed the market forces in adoption and
their effects on children, families, society, and the adoption process itself.
These theorists tend to occupy one of two views. One view advocates “free
market” adoption, which typically involves the removal of barriers on
adoption payments to birth mothers or other regulation of monetary
exchanges in adoption procedures. This viewpoint is best described by
Judge Richard Posner, one of the founders of the law-and-economics
movement of the last half-century.
In opposition to this viewpoint are theorists who have challenged the
“commodification” of adoptees. The commodification of human products,
such as sperm, eggs, and organs, has attracted much attention from
observers who question the fungibility of these items and who warn that
these markets are immoral, if not outright dangerous to those individuals
involved in these markets. Therefore, the law should be hypercritical of
these markets, and necessary measures should be made to protect the
personhood of individuals. The market forces at play in adoption are of
special interest to these personhood advocates because adoptees are
simultaneously both individuals and the biological product of their birth
parents. Professor Margaret Radin best represents this “personhood” ideal
and has delivered much of its rhetoric on the topic of adoption. This section
will outline these two competing and responsive theories of adoption
market forces, relying on Posner and Radin for the key tenets.
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A. Free-Market Adoption
In 1978, while a Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, Judge
Posner—a key proponent of “Law-and-Economics” theory—proposed a
reanalysis of the law’s view of the adoption market.46 Posner developed a
model of supply and demand in the adoption process, one built around a
system of regulation and social forces that does not differ drastically from
those presently at play. By that point in time, as is true today, adoption
agencies—both public and private—had grown to dominate over
independent adoption.47 The restrictions on payments to birth parents were
nationwide by this point, meaning that most states limited a child’s “price”
to the direct medical expenses and, at most, some maintenance expenses for
the end of the pregnancy.48
Posner cited several similarities between adoption regulations and those
seen in “explicit markets,” including the monopolization by governmentsponsored institutions and the hindrance on full pricing.49 However,
adoption did have several distinct characteristics: the collusion seen
between agencies, the agencies’ inability to refuse the children offered to
them, and the availability of a close, unregulated substitute to the
agencies—namely, independent adoption.50 Estimating the potential
demand for adoption by comparing the percentage of childless couples with
the percentage of young women who had indicated their expectation to
remain childless,51 Posner noted a surprising lack of utilization of
independent adoption.52 This he attributed to the restriction on fees, which
artificially decreased the financial value of children.53 Hence, not only were
fewer children being put into adoption, the market was providing children at
an underappreciated cost, and the limited supply was therefore disappearing
at a much quicker rate.54
Posner’s main issue with restricted independent adoption fees was that
the fees did not represent the birth mother’s true expenses for the pregnancy
and the subsequent adoption. While most systems did allow for
compensation for medical and legal services and for some living expenses,
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other costs were beyond compensation. Posner listed three chief costs that
were undercompensated: (1) the opportunity costs of the birth mother
during her pregnancy, over and above her living expenses; (2) both the
physical and emotional suffering experienced as a result of the pregnancy
and adoption; and (3) the costs of locating the middlemen who would
connect the birth mother and the adoptive parents.55 While this last category
of cost is minor, it still represents a crucial obstacle to market-efficient
adoption. Although permissible costs can be slightly inflated due to the lack
of scrutiny, the unavailability of fully legitimate payments to middlemen
results in the duty of connecting birth mothers with adoptive parents to fall
on those people who are already committed to the adoption process, either
financially or not: attorneys, obstetricians, or the birth mothers
themselves.56 With full legal compensation, middlemen could more
effectively connect birth parents with adoptive parents—an attractive idea
in a market where these persons might be socially and geographically
removed from one another and who likely lack experience in the adoption
process.57
Along with more efficient and professional placement of children, the
expansion of payments in independent adoption would affect other desirable
results. In the adoption process, both now and in 1978, birth mothers have
had little financial incentive to give a child up for adoption rather than abort
their pregnancies.58 Also, public assistance might often be available to cover
the medical expenses that adoption would otherwise cover, so birth mothers
might feasibly be less inclined to opt for adoption if they are already
incurring the same opportunity costs by raising the child.59 A free
independent market would more fully compensate women for the physical,
emotional, and economic consequences of their pregnancy. Therefore, this
system would also reduce any incentive to seek compensation in the black
market.60 Lastly, the constraints on independent adoption payments may be
responsible for the number of children in foster care, because birth mothers
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who already intend to relinquish their parental rights have no financial
incentive to place a child in adoption.61
This last argument, while contentious, certainly seems intuitive. It also
could contain more implications for the adoption supply than Posner
intended. With an increased incentive comes a more frequent termination of
birth parental rights. Some birth parents, whose parental rights might not
have otherwise been terminated, might voluntarily terminate their parental
rights in order to receive compensation. In addition, some birth parents
whose rights would still have been terminated might expedite the process,
therefore accelerating the child’s placement. While some birth parents
might actually withhold termination until adoptive parents willing to
compensate were located, the essential argument persists that with more
incentive to adopt comes more effort to make adoption happen.
In response to anticipated arguments against free-market adoption,
Posner recognized that the assignment of children by price was not designed
to promote the best interests of children.62 However, Posner argued, agency
adoption did not act exclusively in the children’s best interests, because (1)
parents were not categorized by parental fitness once the state determined
their qualifications to adopt, and (2) the particular best interests of the
children were rarely discernible at their young age.63 Therefore, as long as
states still screened independent adoption parents by the same standards as
agencies, the same level of safeguards against abuse would exist.64
Posner challenged several other anticipated criticisms, but one possible
rebuttal was not addressed. With pregnancy being theoretically a costneutral activity, any slight increase of a birth mother’s entitlement to costs
might allow reproduction to become profitable. Posner already suggests that
regulated grey-market payments are prone to semi-fraudulent inflation.65
However, he does not present any method which might prevent free-market
adoption from experiencing the same semi-fraud. Most likely, he would
treat this circumstance as an inevitable and unfortunate, but ultimately
inconsequential, outcome of this preferable system.
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Posner has since backed away somewhat from his original position on
this subject, recognizing that the threat of child abusers and the potential
influence of eugenics into such a market form serious obstacles to freemarket adoption.66 Still, according to Posner, the free market should be
considered for its desirable effects of reducing abortions, providing an
alternative to black-market adoption, and relieving the severe demand
problem in lawful adoption.67
B. Personhood Model
Opposite Posner’s free-market version of adoption is Professor Margaret
Radin’s protest against the commodification of personhood interests.68
Radin—who analyzes the markets for such concepts as genetic material,
organs, and sexual intercourse—includes adoption in her spectrum of
markets whose commodification threatens the personhood of individuals
and the sanctity of individual rights. Her challenge to this (perceived)
universal commodification of ideas tied to personhood places emphasis on
both the literal and rhetorical markets revolving around these subjects.69 As
an example of the role market rhetoric plays in contested commodities,
Radin uses Posner’s 1978 article by emphasizing his monetary qualification
of human interaction.70 However, Posner is not alone, as Radin points out,
in his financial perception of humanity: even Hobbes conceived of a
person’s needs, values, and desires in terms of price.71
The danger in this model of thinking, Radin argues, is that the
objectification of a person’s attributes to his or her personhood dangerously
erodes his or her individual autonomy.72 While the commodification of
human commodities does not necessarily equate to slavery, the effect is
similar:
[P]ersons . . . possess objects that they may control or
manipulate to achieve their ends. Objectification is improper
treatment of persons because it makes them means, not ends. As
means, objects may be bought and sold in markets, to achieve
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satisfaction of persons’ needs and desires. Objects, but not persons,
may be commodified.73
This threat is doubly true in adoption, which objectifies not only the child
itself, but also the reproductive abilities of the birth parents.74
In addition to objectification, the subordination of persons is an effect of
these contested markets.75 Radin defined wrongful subordination as the
“unjustified dominance or exercise of power by one person or group over
another.”76 Subordination could be viewed as a side-effect of
objectification, such as when certain characteristics of a person are viewed
as inferior or superior to those of others.77 Hence, the marketability of
human attributes—either through a direct market or through market
rhetoric—has the initial effect of objectification, which leads to
subordination. In short, putting quantifiable values on persons based on
their most immediate characteristics would enforce social hierarchy.
Adoption potentially facilitates a particularly invasive form of
subordination. When a baby or child is objectified, all of its attributes—sex,
race, hair color, predicted intelligence, predicted height—become part of its
“worth.”78 In both a literal and a rhetorical market, therefore, there exist
inferior and superior children. These categories of worth are based on
demographics, such as race and gender, which reinforce stigmas that society
might otherwise find offensive, or at least distasteful. This leads those who
observe these commodified adoptions to base their own self-worth in terms
of the adoption market.79 This might be true not just for those individuals
who participate in the adoptions, but also for anyone on the periphery who
becomes aware of the price of the adoption and how that price differs based
on a child’s characteristics.80 Posner himself was concerned about the
implications of an open market in which prices for babies were racially
stratified; unable to offer a solution, he admitted that his model could
potentially exacerbate racial tensions.81
Radin speaks of this kind of pervasiveness as the “domino effect” of
commodification. Under this theory, the existence of a commodified version
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(such as prostitution) of a personhood interest (sexual intercourse, in this
example) will contaminate the entire interest such that all versions can be
spoken of in the market rhetoric of the commodified version.82 The domino
theory has great application in the adoption market, where people will not
only view other parent-child relationships in market terms, but will view all
children—and even themselves—in terms of their marketable attributes.
Furthermore, if the commodification of persons at birth is permissible, then
the commodification of persons at other points in their lives is less
objectionable.
Radin does not actually believe that a free market for children would be a
slippery slope to permissible slavery, but does argue that the social
permissibility of adoption is due to the lack of a free market.83 It is the twopart selflessness of adoption—of parting with one’s child while another
person accepts the child as his or her own—that distinguishes adoption from
slavery; the positive perception that this selflessness creates is what makes
adoption not only palatable to society but even noble.84 The relinquishment
of a child is typically viewed as admirable, since there is the presumption
that it is being done for the child’s best interests. Once the prospect of
monetary gain appears, this sense of altruism might disappear.85 The death
of altruism is another common theme in Radin’s view of universal
commodification, and it plays an important role in the domino theory.86
Even if the complete commodification of children did not lead to the
erosion of adoption as a socially permissible practice, it might still have the
effect of nullifying the majority of adoption’s social importance and
prestige. Adoption would be viewed as less honorable, for both the birth
mother and the adoptive parents. Communities would be denied these
examples of selflessness, and adopted children would suffer both by
viewing themselves as commodities and by being perceived as
commodities.
Taking all of these possibilities into account, Radin ultimately questions
whether even the partial commodification of children via adoption could
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truly lead to the results she fears.87 Even if people come to view themselves
according to the values of the adoption market, this does not preclude them
from still retaining a noncommercial view of themselves.88 In addition, the
domino theory assumes that we cannot know the price of something and
still view it as priceless.89 Of course, there is no guarantee that the
commodification of adoption would rob it of its social worth.
While Radin’s view certainly gives a broader scope to the dynamics of
adoption and its effects on the social fabric, its commitment to the
preservation of personhood often leads it to overlook or dismiss the social
benefits of present-day adoption. Adoptions tainted by objectification and
subordination might still represent a superior result to any feasible
alternative. The aspiration of removing all objectification and subordination
from adoption is not only unrealistic, it also ignores the social wealth
created by timely and well-executed traditional adoptions.
C. Poststructuralist View
While the detriments of a legal free market for adoption severely
outweigh its benefits, the free market does pose a solution to the adoption
crunch. However, the threats of objectification, subordination, and the loss
of altruism prevent the serious consideration of Posner’s proposal.
Some synthesis of Posner’s free-market adoption with that of Radin’s
personhood model has been suggested.90 While both Radin and Posner’s
approaches have been designated as overly unitary and uncompromising,91 a
poststructuralist view of commodification would allow for market
mechanisms to empower marginalized people who circumvent traditional
reproduction.92 This viewpoint perceives the introduction of economics into
intimate relationships as noncontradictory, and often as an acceptable
validation of relationships.93 The ability to commodify something does not
necessarily lead to commodification; instead, markets should be channeled
to serve the single goal of enhancing human benefit.94
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This poststructuralist view is of great use, allowing observers of adoption
to speak of adoption in market rhetoric with the express interest of
improving social wealth. Given Radin’s own doubts about the danger of
commodification in adoption, this article will proceed to evaluate the
adoption process in its market terms, with the view that other marketconscious action besides free-market adoption can be taken without
critically endangering personhood and adoption as a worthwhile social
enterprise.

III. PAST AND ONGOING MEASURES
This article will next explore past and proposed measures that have
affected—or seek to affect—the adoption crunch. Although no past
measures have expressly confronted the market forces in adoption, some
measures have affected the market behavior of adoption and effectively
achieved some of the benefits Posner sought to affect via free-market
adoption while (in some instances) mitigating the fears posed by Radin.
These measures can be organized into three categories: those designed to
promote welfare adoption, those designed to curb black-market adoption,
and those designed to dissuade grey-market adoption.
A. The Uniform Adoption Act
The first attempt at establishing a uniform set of adoption laws across
states was made in 1953, when the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws published its Uniform Adoption Act (UAA).95 Not
until the act was revised in 1969 did any state ratify the Act.96 The Act was
again ratified in 1994, to which only Vermont signed.97
In both the 1969 and 1994 versions, the UAA requires that adoptive
parents report their expenditures related to their adoption, including any
services related to such placement.98 Prior to a final adoption hearing, the
adoptive parents must file an account of any payment or exchange made on
their behalf in connection with the adoption. This account must include the
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date and amount of each payment, along with a statement as to its purpose.
Any lawyers involved in the adoption—whether they represent the adoptive
parents, the child, or the birth parents—must make a similar account of any
payments received in connection with the adoption. Depending on whether
the adoption was independent or not, any agency or guardian must do the
same. The UAA encourages that accounting be as exact as possible, and to
include the identity of any person or entity involved in the handling of
adoption expenses.99
The UAA specifies both lawful and unlawful payments.100 For example,
the UAA forbids the exchange of money or any items of value for the
express placement of a minor for adoption. The UAA also explicitly forbids
any payment for the birth parents’ consent or relinquishment. However, the
act does allow payment to agencies for their services in connection with the
adoption, including those incurred in locating the child—such as advertising
costs. More importantly, it allows for several categories of compensation to
the birth parents: (1) the medical, pharmaceutical, and traveling expenses
incurred by the birth mother in connection with the birth (or any illness to
the child); (2) any counseling services for the parent(s) for a reasonable time
before or after the adoption placement; (3) living expenses for the mother
within a reasonable time before the birth and for no more than six weeks
after the birth; and (4) any legal costs incurred by the birth parents.
In addition, the UAA gives a framework for the fees and compensation
that an agency may demand.101 The agency may charge the adoptive parents
for any of its own legal services made in connection with an adoption, along
with costs relating to preplacement evaluations and background checks.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the agency may charge a percentage
of the agency’s annual expenses relating to locating and counseling the birth
parents, the adoptees, and the adoptive parents; however, no guidelines are
given as to determining this percentage.
The UAA, whose existence predates both Posner’s and Radin’s work,
presents a middle ground between a deregulated model of free-market
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adoption and a system devoted to personhood interests as described by
Radin. Both Posner and the UAA strived to make adoption a cost-neutral
process for the birth mother; first, by advocating for compensation for
counseling and then by allowing the reasonable living expenses of the birth
mother to be passed on to the adoptive family. However, the UAA differs in
an important fashion from the payment structure proposed by Posner. First,
any compensation for the birth mother’s physical and emotional suffering is
limited to the actual cost of treatment; there is no compensation for
enduring the pregnancy and birth. Second, there is no compensation for the
birth mother’s opportunity costs over and above her living expenses.
Therefore, the child cannot be exchanged for the value of her next best
financial opportunity, most likely the employment that she missed out on
due to her pregnancy. Because of these two differences in permissible
payments, the UAA represents a nonprofitable alternative to the free-market
model.
Because of this lack of profitability, the UAA retreats from the
heightened form of commodification that Posner’s model presented.
Additionally, it preserves much of the altruism undertaken by birth mothers
by maintaining their “volunteer” status in giving a child up for adoption.
However, cost-neutralizing payments—even those limited to actual costs—
still treat the birth mother as the means to an end. Additionally, the
exchange of any payments between the birth mother and the adoptive
parents creates a quid pro quo relationship that implies a compensatory
scheme that rewards the birth mother for her genetic attributes. Assuming
that some women cannot locate adoptive parents willing to provide payment
for their pregnancy leading to adoption, the UAA still objectifies and
subordinates adoptees and their birth mothers.
B. Baby Broker Acts
“Black-market” adoption has been a topic of concern for American
legislatures since at least the 1950s.102 In order to expressly tackle the issue
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of black-market adoption, multiple jurisdictions enacted “baby broker acts,”
which penalize, by some mix of civil or criminal sanctions, the adoption of
a child through unlicensed means.103 Typically, these acts prevent the
reception of money in exchange for arranging an adoption or for placing a
child for adoption.104 The important distinction to make between any illicit
payments that these acts prohibit and the permissible payments made to
lawyers, birth mothers, and agencies is that the permissible payments are
viewed as a reimbursement for costs or services related to the adoption.
Payments become illegal when they no longer pertain to these two
categories and instead are intended as profit for the child itself. Predictably,
considerable confusion has arisen trying to distinguish between lawful and
unlawful payments.105 This distinction becomes crucial in jurisdictions
which follow the UAA’s recommendation of requiring judicial approval of
all adoption expenses; in these jurisdictions, the unwitting inclusion of an
improper payment can result in the refusal of the adoption petition.106 Due
to this and other consequences caused by uncertainty, a call has arisen for
more definite direction as to permissible payments in independent
adoption.107
In addition, the enforcement of baby broker acts has been hindered by the
difficulty of distinguishing between illegal payments and permissible
monetary benefits made to the child.108 Some courts have interpreted the
permissibility of reimbursement for a birth mother’s medical expenses as
inconsistent with a prohibition on reimbursement for other expenses
incurred but unpaid and have accordingly expanded the scope of
permissible payments.109 Essentially, this view of payment seems to
embrace, at least somewhat, the broader vision of adoption reimbursement
proposed by Posner.
Lastly, baby broker acts have encountered vagueness issues, with several
courts finding that these statutes are overbroad and do not give sufficient
certainty as to the prohibited behavior.110 In Illinois v. Schwartz, a state
district court found that the Illinois baby broker act, which forbade any
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compensation for “placing out,” was unconstitutional by virtue of being
vague, uncertain, and overbroad.111 The defendant was prosecuted for
placing an adoption-eligible child with his clients, but the district court
found that the statute’s definition of “placing out” was so obscure that it
failed to set forth constitutionally sufficient standards of conduct.112 On
appeal, the state supreme court found that the statute was in fact definite
enough to inform attorneys of permissible and impermissible behavior.113
Specifically, the statute provided that only a child welfare agency could
request or receive compensation for the placement of children.114 Therefore,
the statute, when applied to an attorney, would not infringe upon his or her
ability to perform legal services; it merely established that an attorney could
not act as a paid intermediary or placement agent for a party desiring to buy
or sell a child, the same as any other individual.115
While Posner took express measures to explain how his model would not
allow for black-market adoptions, his free-market model would not likely
be consistent with any active baby broker act. This is because of the
difficulties that would likely arise in seeking payments for “middlemen” in
independent adoption—agents whose sole function in the adoption process
would be to connect birth mothers and adoptive parents. Such “middlemen”
would likely function as the “baby brokers” that such measures were
designed to eliminate. While agencies fulfill this function in most forms of
adoption, in independent adoption this role usually falls on lawyers, doctors,
or the birth parents themselves. Posner adamantly argued in favor of the
permissible function for independent middlemen in order to provide
efficiency in a dispersed and nuanced market. However, since such
middlemen would not be providing any function autonomous from the
adoption placement (such as legal advice or medical service), they could
reasonably be judged to be profiting solely off the child. Therefore, they
would likely be in violation of most (if not all) baby broker acts. This result
might be avoided if middlemen were to provide some additional or nominal
service—such as adoption counseling or advertisement. However, due to

STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP

Market Forces in Domestic Adoptions 753

the vague language and conceptions surrounding impermissible payment,
there is no guarantee that a court might not interpret such a function as
being equivalent to an adoption agent charging a commission for a
successful sale and hence profiting off the adoption. There is no indication
that Posner held a different view of these agents.
Radin, perhaps ironically, might agree with courts that have found the
permissibility of medical expenses to be inconsistent with a prohibition on
other expenses. However, while the judicial response has been to expand
the scope of permissible payments,116 Radin’s proposal would almost
certainly be to reduce—or even remove—the spectrum of legal payment.
Even without resorting to a slippery-slope domino theory of
commodification, the use of one set of justified payments in independent
adoption would still create a subtext of objectification and subordination. It
might then seem arbitrary to disallow another set of payments because of a
lack of service or costs traditionally associated with adoption.
In defense of baby broker acts, Radin could point to their preservation of
society’s perception of altruism in adoption. Without such measures, the
existence of for-profit adoption and baby brokers could create a social
backlash against adoption. This disfavor might be limited to independent
adoption, but the presence of a market for adoptees might jeopardize the
entire concept. Baby broker acts therefore ensure that all adoption payments
are made in pursuit of the adoptee’s best interests.
C. Expansion of Categories of Potential Parents
As already discussed, states have been allowing different categories of
applicants for adoption. While this allowance might increase the demand for
adoptive children by increasing the supply of potential adoptive parents, it
might also increase the adoption rates for foster children and other less indemand adoptees.
One proposed solution to the lack of interest in foster care adoption has
been the use of joint adoption between two single persons who are not
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married or otherwise romantically involved.117 In such an adoption, two
platonic individuals, whether cohabitating or living separately, would both
be declared parents of a child and would share parental duties under their
own informal structure. This departure from the traditional vision of nuclear
family is in keeping with the expansion of categories of potential adoptive
parents.118 However, even though most state statutes do not expressly
prohibit two persons who are not romantically involved from adopting,
courts still adhere to the vision of co-parents sharing some similarity to a
traditional family unit.119
This proposal is additionally unique in the fact that it is targeted
specifically at providing greater adoption opportunities for hard-to-place
children, who otherwise might never locate a set of parents to provide a
family atmosphere.120 In particular, this proposal seeks to increase the
number of adoptive parents for African American children, under the theory
that present categories of adoptive parents do not adequately fit the African
American community.121 African American children are disproportionately
represented in foster care, and the prospect of single parenting—while
burdensome for even a prosperous individual—may be particularly
problematic for African Americans due to the economic barriers facing this
demographic.122 The need to encourage adoption within the African
American community has been a topic for over a quarter-century, due to the
issue of interracial adoption and the placement of African American
children with white adoptive parents.123 In 1994, the National Association
of Black Social Workers called for the removal of barriers to intra-racial
adoption.124
As mentioned earlier, the adoption avenues for gay and lesbian
prospective parents are widening. This change in adoption practices has
taken a variety of forms. Gay and lesbian adoption not only includes the
adoption of a child by a homosexual couple, but also the second-parent
adoption by a homosexual partner of a biological parent. Additionally, there
is a growing acceptance of adoption by openly gay single individuals who
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previously might have needed to conceal their homosexuality in order to
qualify as a prospective parent.125 Currently, these developments represent
one of the most heated areas of discussion and concern in adoption. State
courts and legislatures are rapidly confronting difficult issues surrounding
same-sex adoption, often because of vague statutory language,
constitutional equal protection issues, or a lack of precedent.126 While this
category of potential parents is currently in a great amount of fluctuation,
what seems certain is that homosexual individuals are going to represent a
larger percentage of adoptive parents in this century than in the last.
The expansion of adoption by means of increasing adoption by African
American and same-sex parents presents a mostly positive outcome for the
preservation of personhood and altruism in adoption. This expansion of
adoption could potentially relieve much of the strain on the foster care
system by increasing the supply of parents interested in special-needs
adoption. The adoption of a special-needs child by a nontraditional family
would likely be viewed as a perfectly selfless act. It could also be viewed as
an epitome of social wealth maximization—even a kind of synergy. An
otherwise unadopted child is given a familial home, the state is relieved of
providing for one more foster child, and minorities—both in a communal
and individual sense—are given access to a social institution that they
otherwise could not take part in.127
Also, by increasing the involvement of under-represented categories of
adoptive parents, these measures could also help relieve the objectification
and subordination that Radin viewed as widespread in traditional adoption.
Increased minority participation in adoption will counteract the perception
of adoption as being a mainly Caucasian institution and provide a less
overall biased market in independent or agency adoption. And any increase
in foster care adoption is beneficial for personhood interests, since—on the
whole—these adoptions are likely lacking in any objectification of the child
according to preferred physical and genetic features.
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D. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act
The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (AACWA), passed by
Congress in 1980, was an effort to provide financial incentives to any state
that maintained a financial assistance program to promote the adoption of
special-needs children.128 It was expressly intended to enable families to
provide permanent care to children who otherwise would likely spend their
entire childhood in foster care.129 Due to the sometimes prohibitive costs of
adopting a child with physical or psychological disabilities, some guardians
might be persuaded to remain foster parents due to the subsidies provided
by state social services. Under AACWA, however, this consideration would
be neutralized, and foster parents would feasibly be more inclined to form a
permanent parent-child relationship via adoption.130
However, AACWA went beyond simply removing barriers to the
adoption of the physically and mentally handicapped. It applied a very
broad definition of a “special-needs child”: one which included age, ethnic
background, or any other factor that would reasonably prevent adoptive
placement.131 Because it did not limit its definition of special needs to those
situations which would inherently include extra financial burden, AACWA
had the additional function of promoting foster adoption overall. This policy
became explicit in subsequent amendments, and the portion of the act
authorizing the adoption incentive program is now known as the Adoption
Promotion Act of 2003.132 Other federal law requires states to actively
promote adoption assistance for children in foster care placements.133 To
qualify for federal funds, states must reimburse adoptive parents for any
nonrecurring expenses and Medicaid coverage.134 The statute dictates that
“nonrecurring adoption expenses” include reasonable adoption fees, court
costs and attorney fees.135 Other expenses directly related to legal adoption,
such as health and home examination fees or transportation costs, may also
be compensated.136
However broad its definition of special needs, the AACWA still limits its
incentives based on the financial status of the child. While states are
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allowed to show discretion as to the design of their adoption support
programs, they must still meet the Act’s eligibility requirements. In addition
to being a special-needs child, the child must either be (1) eligible for Aid
for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), (2) eligible for
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), or (3) the child of a minor in foster
care.137 AFDC, reformed into Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) in 1997, is a monthly cash benefit for families who fall below the
poverty line; the child is considered eligible if the family from which he or
she was removed would have qualified for this support.138 SSI has a
somewhat higher income eligibility requirement, but the child must be
disabled.139 It is significant that while these requirements restrict the
availability of AACWA funds based on the financial circumstances from
which the child came from, accessibility is not restricted by the means of
the adoptive parents; the consideration of the economic standing of the
adoptive parents is forbidden by federal law.140
Other restrictions on the dissemination of AACWA subsidies remain.
One is the requirement that a reasonable, but unsuccessful, attempt be made
to place special-needs children without triggering the Act’s financial
assistance.141 The only exception for this requirement is when, because of a
significant emotional tie with foster parents now attempting to adopt, the
child’s best interests would dictate that he or she remain in this relationship
rather than be placed elsewhere.142 If the child’s foster caregivers establish
that they would be unable to adopt without a subsidy, this requirement
would be met.143 Otherwise, the child’s caseworker must establish that an
effort was made to place the child without assistance; this requirement can
be met by submitting the child’s profile to adoption agencies or
exchanges.144
The other requirement is that “the State has determined that the child
cannot or should not be returned to the home of his parents.”145 Usually, this
requirement is satisfied by a court order terminating the original parental
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rights. However, the filing of a petition for termination or voluntary
relinquishment can suffice.146
While the AACWA represents an admirable attempt at removing the
financial barriers of special-needs adoption and providing financial
incentives for foster care adoption, its limitations hinder its ability to truly
influence market behavior and provide a full-fledged push for foster care
adoption.
E. Adoption and Safe Families Act
In 1997, Congress enacted the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA),
which was hailed as the “most sweeping chang[e] to the nation’s adoption
and foster care system in nearly two decades.”147 The bill had two major cofunctions: (1) to move children quickly from foster care to adoption, and (2)
to shift the interest of foster care from “reunification with birth parents” to
“best interests of the child.”148 The ASFA was intended to improve the
policies embodied in AACWA, largely by amending the reasonable efforts
to preserve original parental rights.149
The primary step toward accomplishing this goal was to expedite the
termination of parental rights when: (1) a parent had subjected the child to
“aggravated circumstances,” (2) the parent had committed certain criminal
acts, or (3) parental rights had already been involuntarily terminated for a
sibling.150 Absent any of these circumstances, the law then mandated the
filing of a petition for termination of parental rights within specified time
constraints, usually within fifteen months of a child entering foster care.151
The only exceptions to the termination petition were if (1) the child was
in the care of a relative, (2) the state agency determined that termination
was not in the child’s best interests, or (3) when the parents had not been
given access to social services that could potentially result in
reunification.152 State agencies were required to develop reasonable
placement strategies for each individual foster child, regardless of the
child’s situation, in order to encourage quick placement into a permanent
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living situation.153 States were also encouraged to enter into interstate
compacts to facilitate adoption and protect the interests of the adopted child
with regard to adoption assistance.
Congress strengthened the ASFA’s ability to promote foster care
adoption by offering federal funds to states that were able to increase
placement of foster care adoptees, especially older and disabled children.154
Under the incentive program, states would be credited $4,000 for each
foster care adoption in excess of the previous fiscal year, with an additional
$2,000 for each additional special-needs foster adoption.155
State courts began using ASFA as evidence of a federal interest to
expedite the termination of all parental rights rather than prolong efforts to
unify or repair broken and abusive families. Specifically, they concluded
that previous policies promoting family reunification conflicted with the
ASFA, and birth parents were no longer afforded an unlimited period of
time to address and resolve negligence or abuse issues.156 Some courts have
gone further, and found that the ASFA’s focus on child safety and its
mandate for quick and permanent placement effectively precluded state
agencies from working aggressively toward reunifying the child with its
family if returning the child is not appropriate.157 Courts have even
interpreted the ASFA to give foster children an enforceable federal statutory
right to have a state initiate termination of parental rights proceedings when
they have been in foster care for the necessary fifteen months; children can
also demand that states attempt to identify, recruit, and approve a qualified
family for their adoption.158 Several courts even interpreted the ASFA to
apply retroactively, so that children who had entered foster care prior to
state ratification or compliance with the ASFA would nonetheless have
their relationship evaluated and processed according to the act’s
provisions.159 While some states have found the fifteen-month limitation on
reunification unconstitutional,160 others have found that the act still
preserves a parent’s rights regardless of the time limits involved.161
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With little doubt, the ASFA has been responsible for an increase in foster
care adoption. Even after the enactment of the AACWA, the foster care
adoption rate remained roughly fixed between 17,000 and 21,000 annual
adoptions—about 10 percent of the national foster child population.162 By
2000, the number had risen to 46,000; in 2002, 53,000 foster care adoptions
took place.163 This increase demonstrates not only the potential success of
state incentives to adoption, but it also suggests that the potential demand
for foster adoption is not limited to the traditional placement figures.164 The
ASFA also provides an excellent example of the influence legislation can
have upon “market behavior.”
However, this increase in foster adoption might not have offset the
increase in children whose relationships with their birth parents have been
severed as a result of the ASFA.165 Even by 2000, federal data indicated that
ASFA had expanded the population of children needing adoptive parents,
which had jumped from 86,000 in 1993 to 117,000 in 1999.166 The biggest
criticism of the ASFA has almost certainly been its focus on termination of
parental rights without regard to a child’s real chances for adoption.167 This
effect has a particular potential for impact on children of color in foster
care.168 Such children represent a disproportionately large percentage of the
foster care population, yet substantial barriers still exist for nonwhite
prospective adoptive parents.169
Ultimately, the ASFA is the most ambitious example of adoption
regulation—federal or otherwise—for the purpose of influencing market
behavior in adoption. It provides incentives for states to encourage foster
care adoption and removes the boundaries that still exist for potential
adoptive parents to utilize the subsidies available under the AACWA.
However, it accomplished these goals by increasing the supply of foster
care children, arguably at the expense of the birth parents’ parental rights.170
States, in their eagerness to facilitate the policy goals of the ASFA and to
gain access to the cumulative federal funds, appear to have overlooked the
consequences of an increased pool of potential foster adoptees. While an
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increase in foster care adoption promotes altruism and diminishes the
objectification of children and birth parents in adoption, under the ASFA,
these benefits come at the cost of racial and classist subordination.
Again, as seen in the other measures explored in this article, no benefit in
adoption law comes without costs. The question of whether these costs are
acceptable, given the benefits, is beyond the scope of this article. However,
this article will advocate several measures that confront the market forces at
work in adoption that, hopefully, can produce benefits that outweigh any
potential costs.

IV. PROPOSED REMEDIES
A. Federalization of Adoption
While such measures as the Uniform Adoption Act, the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act, and the Adoption and Safe Families Act
have sought in various ways to standardize adoption nationwide, their only
method of implementation has been via voluntary subscription or financial
enticement. A true and complete federalization of adoption would offer
several benefits and would relieve adoption of some of its marketinfluenced shortcomings. Differences between states’ adoption statutes
could potentially deny adoptees protections they might have if they
remained in their home states. Furthermore, absent some kind of agreement,
an adoptee’s home state could lose control over the adoption and any
authority to protect the child’s best interests.
Aware of these issues, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have
implemented the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC),
which was drafted in 1960.171 As part of the ICPC, every state contains an
office that is part of the department of public welfare or the state’s
equivalent agency; this office is designated to serve as the central clearing
point for all referrals for interstate placements.172 The office’s administrator
and deputies are authorized to conduct the necessary investigation of the
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proposed placement.173 This process requires that the prospective sending
party (often an agency) submit a written notice of the proposed placement
to the ICPC office in the receiving state.174 Notice must also be submitted to
the sending state’s office.175 The notice must include a social history of the
child and a case plan. Before placement is finalized, a predetermined child
welfare agency in the receiving state will conduct a study of the prospective
adoptive home and then prepare a report on whether or not the placement
should be made.176 If either state’s office determines that the placement
cannot or should not be made, the placement will be denied.177 The
recommended time for this process is at least six weeks.178
While the ICPC does an admirable job of ensuring that interstate
adoptees will be provided the same protections and services as if they had
remained in their home states, the federalization of adoption would remove
the need for this compact and its respective procedures and offices, thereby
increasing the efficiency, expediency, and simplicity for interstate
adoptions. A nationwide adoption act would ensure that the same placement
standards were being applied across state borders, thus removing the need
for communication between state offices concerning differing protections
and definitions for child welfare.
Most notably, federalization of adoption would prevent the advantageous
usage of more market-favorable statutes among jurisdictions. Adoptive
parents seeking independent adoption across state lines are in a position to
take advantage of less stringent baby broker or adoption payment statutes.
Currently, the ICPC protects against this kind of forum shopping in agency
placement.179 However, numerous difficulties arise when applying the ICPC
in independent adoption, and jurisdictions vary widely on when certain
situations qualify as an “interstate placement.”180 Under the weightiest
precedential interpretations of the ICPC, a birth mother is still allowed to
travel from her home state to the state of the adoptive parents in order to
complete the adoption free of any constraints in her home state.181 Also,
there is no penalty for working around interstate safeguards, except for
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some additional cost and inconvenience, by having adoptive parents
temporarily live within the birth mother’s home state and finalize the
adoption there before returning to their separate state.182
The barriers to true federalization of adoption are formidable, if not
insurmountable, due to the current constitutional view of federalism and the
noncommercial perception of adoption. However, an argument could be
advanced that adoption falls under the Commerce Clause of Article I of the
U.S. Constitution and therefore can be subject to mandatory federal
regulation. While interpretation of the Commerce Clause has varied widely
throughout American history, the current view allows for federal regulation
of any activity that substantially impacts interstate commerce.183 In light of
the obvious market forces present in adoption, and the disparity between
states influencing interstate adoption, one could argue that adoption—
despite its apparent noncommercial nature—still impacts interstate
commerce to a degree that allows for federal regulation. There are
numerous barriers to this theory, the most obvious being the traditional
state-oriented character of adoption and the rights of states to specifically
monitor the future lives of its children. These concerns are unfortunately too
immense to be considered further in this article. This article can only
conclude that true federalization of adoption does not represent a likely
solution.
B. Quantitative Cap on Private Agency Adoption Fees
A more feasible measure, one which will hopefully counteract the
commodification of adoption while preserving the advantages of agency
adoption, is a cap or limitation on private agency adoption fees. As
discussed at the beginning of this article, adoption fees have grown at a
seemingly exponential rate since they were first introduced in the 1950s.
A quantitative cap on private agency fees is a variation of a suggestion
made by Posner, who viewed agency adoption as a state-sponsored semimonopoly. Ideally, unlike most monopolies, private agencies would not
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have the effect of inflating the price of adoption. This would theoretically
be impermissible due to the regulations limiting agency fees to the average
actual cost of an adoption. But as several authors point out, agency fees
have inflated regardless of the adoption costs. Furthermore, as Posner
suggested, private agencies also represent a possible deterrent to potential
adoptive parents due to their increased monitoring and “inefficiency” in
matching and placing adoptees with adoptive parents. Posner’s solution to
this perceived inefficiency was the promotion of independent adoption.
However, as a normative view advocated by this article, agency adoption
should be encouraged over independent adoption. The greater amount of
oversight and attention paid to the qualities of prospective parents and best
interests of adoptive children is an essential function that agencies serve.
Not only does this protect adoptees from potential abuse and exploitation,
but this level of investigation ensures a positive public perception of
adoption as a responsibly monitored enterprise. To refer to these measures
as “inefficient” overlooks not only their inherent necessity but the
safeguards of personhood that they provide. Although agency adoption is
still implicit in the commodification of adoption, this avenue of adoption
has less potential for inflated costs and illicit activity than independent
adoption.
As long as money changes hands in the course of adoption, some
commodification of the process is inevitable. Even as acknowledged by
Radin, these monetary exchanges are not likely to provide a slippery slope
to the complete commodification of human interests. Furthermore, adoption
holds some inherent selflessness and is not endangered by reasonable
commodification, especially if that commodification occurs under
regulations that are conscious of their potential effects of objectification and
subordination. Using a poststructuralist view, this consciousness allows for
commodification when doing so improves social wealth. Agency adoption
represents the best compromise between the best interest of the child and
the inherent market forces of adoption.
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The desired effect of limiting agency costs is three-fold. The first goal is
to promote agency adoption by lowering costs. The second goal is to
decrease the attractiveness of independent adoption, chiefly by reducing the
costs of agency adoption. An unintended result of the measure could be the
increased attractiveness of agency adoption as opposed to intercountry
adoption. This article is unbiased toward intercountry adoption. Again, the
policy of intercountry adoption and its market forces are outside this
article’s scope. The third, and most important, goal is to decrease adoption
as a source of profit, both for the parties and the agencies, in order to protect
the personhood of the child and to preserve the image of adoption as an
admirable social institution.
This proposal carries several possible drawbacks. Chiefly, it could
potentially drive agencies out of business and decrease the quality and
effectiveness of professional agents. This is a major concern that could
undermine all of the measure’s intended goals. A failure of private agency
adoption could result in more independent adoption and a boost to the gray
market. Also, putting a cap on private adoption fees might hamper the
adoption system and drive more adoptions into state agencies, inflating
foster care numbers and driving up costs to states.
One measure to prevent this outcome would be a state refund for
agencies that adhere to a voluntary cap. Alternatively, the cap could remain
mandatory but be accompanied with a state subsidy for all private adoption
agencies. Both models would allow agencies to remain near their current
solvency, while giving them the social impact of a nonprofit agency.
However, this would effectively remove all incentive to operate a nonprofit
agency and would be very expensive to states, essentially representing the
socialization of adoption.
Another hurdle is that of implementation. For a cap to reach its full
effect, it must be nationwide. Otherwise, states might be hesitant to adopt
this measure due to the belief that it would negatively impact the quality of
private agencies within the state. However, as already discussed, federal
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implementation would encounter serious constitutional obstacles if made
mandatory. To work around this limitation, implementation could take the
same approach as the AACWA and ASFA and provide grants to states that
adopt this measure.
Ultimately, all of these possible drawbacks would become moot if the
measure were successful in promoting agency adoption over other forms of
private adoption. With or without federal grants, states could still benefit by
implementing a private agency cap. A single state implementing this cap
would make it more attractive to out-of-state adoptive parents. While
agencies might have the incentive to relocate or risk profit loss, they would
more likely benefit from increased activity, both from out-of-state adoptive
parents and from parents who might otherwise seek the benefits of
independent adoption. An industry-wide reduction in price could feasibly
reduce the attraction of independent adoption for prospective parents, thus
increasing overall private agency adoption numbers and improving
profitability for private agencies.

CONCLUSION
A cap on private agency adoption is a feasible and desirable step toward
achieving the benefits of free-market adoption while both preserving the
personhood of the adoptee and promoting agency adoption as an alternative
to independent adoption. The measure’s impact on the profitability of
private adoption agencies should be considered, since the demise of these
businesses could destroy this avenue of adoption and have the reverse of the
measure’s intended effects. This result could be prevented either by the
complete socialization of private agencies by implementing a mandatory
cap or by the institution of a state grant for agencies that voluntarily adhere
to the cap. Additionally, adoption of this measure by single states could
maintain the level of profitability for private agencies without the need for
state subsidies, provided that the influx of interstate adoption makes up for
the loss in individual fees.
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